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Western Corporate Fiscal Citizenship 
in the 21st Century 
Alex Freund 
Abstract 
For the Western world, the challenges of the 21st Century are numerous, from 
climate change’s effects on food production and coastal cities to underfunded 
social safety nets to automation’s impact on the middle class. To handle such 
costly problems, government intervention will be required. Government 
intervention, however, always comes at a cost to either individuals or 
corporations. To determine who should bear these costs, scholars and experts 
should turn to notions of fiscal citizenship – the social contract between the 
state and private parties through taxation and the provision of goods and 
services. By applying principles of individual fiscal citizenship to corporations, 
which have traditionally not been included in notions of fiscal citizenship, a 
strong case emerges for corporations to bear the costs of these impending 21st 
century harms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the foreseeable future, global economic, environmental, and social 
conditions will require expensive private and public solutions. With the rise 
of automation, global warming, and underfunded social safety nets among 
these conditions, it is likely that national governments will need to step in to 
cover the scope of the potential economic harm. Of course, government 
intervention always comes at a cost. Either individuals or corporations will 
need to fund the future liabilities incurred to abate these twenty-first 
century harms. 
As a part of the post-World War II global order, taxation has become 
the “lifeblood” of the modern liberal state.1 Consequently, the relationship 
between the public (both as individuals and business entities) and a state’s 
need for revenue, also known as fiscal citizenship, has become of 
paramount importance.2 Up to this point, existing literature on fiscal 
citizenship has focused on the “benefit theory” of taxation with respect to 
individuals, delineating the obligations that individuals have to bolster the 
state’s tax receipts in exchange for rights against specified harms.3 When 
fiscal citizenship is strong, taxpayers adhere to the taxation status quo or 
demand increased taxes and view the state as a legitimate actor raising 
funds for the general welfare.4 When fiscal citizenship is weak, taxpayers 
chastise taxation as oppressive and demand reduced tax liabilities, 
undermining the political and economic stability of the post-war liberal 
state, as government expenditure begin to exceed revenues.5 
To some degree, there exists a cohesive, albeit nuanced, narrative of 
U.S. fiscal citizenship, documenting its decline from the early 1940s to the 
present. Little literature has attempted to address the scope of fiscal 
citizenship in Europe, the other pillar of post-war liberalism outside of 
North America. With an increasingly globalized economy, country-by-
country interdependence has increased, and fiscal citizenship needs to be 
                                                          
 1 Ajay K. Mehrotra, Fiscal Forearms: Taxation as the Lifeblood of the Modern Fiscal 
State, in THE MANY HANDS OF THE STATE: THEORIZING THE COMPLEXITIES OF POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 284, 285(Kimberly Morgan & Ann Orloff eds., 2017). 
 2 See Id. 
 3 See generally Graeme S. Cooper, The Benefit Theory of Taxation, 11 AUSTL. TAX F. 
397 (1994). The two modern theories of taxation are Erik Lindahl’s “benefits theory,” where 
taxpayers pay the state proportionately for the benefits that they receive, and Cecil Pigou’s 
“ability to pay theory,” where taxpayers pay the state based on the taxpayers’ income. Id. at 
441 & 418. 
 4 See Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark, War and Taxes, 4 J. SCHOLARLY PERSP. i, xvii 
(2008). Strong fiscal citizenship does not necessitate the absence of hesitation in increasing 
tax liabilities, only the flexibility and openness to pursue such increases if either fiscally or 
morally necessary. 
 5 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
4 (2004). Weak fiscal citizenship is frequently the manifestation of “everyday 
libertarianism,” where an individual uses Kantian property rights to claim pre-tax income as 
wholly the individual’s and taxation as a confiscatory act. 
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embraced on a multi-national level. Establishing a global framework for 
individual fiscal citizens, however, is only the starting — not focal — point 
of this paper. Using a comparative analysis, this paper intends on applying 
ideas of individual fiscal citizenship developed both in the United States 
and Europe to each region’s respective corporate tax environment in order 
to determine how closely regional corporate fiscal citizenship mirrors 
regional individual fiscal citizenship. 
By examining corporate fiscal citizenship, a relatively untouched area 
of the law through a benefits theory lens, this paper will use existing 
research on individual fiscal citizenship to create a basis for identifying 
what corporate fiscal citizenship looks like in both Europe and the United 
States. The purpose of this exercise is to identify what it means to be a good 
corporate fiscal citizen, irrespective of region, with respect to supplying 
national governments with sufficient receipts to neutralize the previously 
identified twenty-first century negative externalities in exchange for the 
right to cause those externalities. 
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF FISCAL CITIZENSHIP 
A. Social Contract – Rights and Obligations 
Fundamentally, fiscal citizenship is a social contract between the state 
and a class of actors whereby rights are exchanged for obligation in the 
form of tax liabilities. The scope of fiscal citizenship can be as broad and 
ambiguous as United States fiscal citizenship or as narrow as the fiscal 
citizenship of refugees in post-Syrian refugee crisis Germany.6 The social 
contracts with both subjects, while different in scope, have utility for the tax 
policy maker. A thorough analysis allows policy experts to weigh each 
class of actors’ state-granted rights against the class’s obligation to the 
state, assessing whether the class has a sufficient obligation and if the class 
is adequately meeting that obligation. In some instances, the state may even 
determine that the class of actors has a satisfactory obligation but has not 
received comparable rights and that those rights must be expanded.7 If an 
imbalance between a class’s obligation and rights exists and goes 
                                                          
 6 From 2014 through 2017, 1,400,000 immigrants applied for asylum in Germany, 
primarily from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq and 800,000 applications were accepted. See 
Valentina Romei, Billy Ehrenberg-Shannon, Haluka Maier-Borst & Guy Chazan, How well 
Have Germany’s Refugees Integrated?, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.ft. 
com/content/e1c069e0-872f-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787. 
 7 See Lydia DePillis, Changes to the Child Tax Credit: What it Means for Families, 
CNN BUS. (Dec. 16, 2017, 12:50 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/16/news/ 
economy/child-tax-credit/index.html. The 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act increased the Child 
Tax Credit from $1,000 to $2,000 without a related increase in taxes for the lower income 
brackets that can utilize the Child Tax Credit. Similarly, the standard deduction was raised to 
$12,000 for individuals and $24,000 for joint filers, reducing the taxable income of these 
households without increasing the rates on the remaining taxable income and consequently 
the total tax liability. 
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unaddressed for too long, the state risks undermining the credibility of its 
fiscal state and promoting the lynchpin of poor fiscal citizenship, tax 
avoidance.8 
One important component of the modern American fiscal state and 
many of its European peers is that they enforce their social contract through 
inexact withholdings and subsequent tax filings.9 In the United States, most 
Americans must fill out a Form 1040 accounting for their taxable income 
during the previous year by mid-April of every year.10 Some spectators 
have directly advocated for this mass-income tax regime, outlining the 
virtues of both the taxpayer and the collector diligently reviewing the 
obligation collection portion of their contract.11 Of course, not all countries, 
including several in Europe (most notably Germany and the United 
Kingdom), embrace mass-income return filling. Regardless, while these 
countries may not have adopted a mass-income tax regime, at least some 
individual taxpayers are required to file tax returns.12 On the corporate side, 
U.S. corporations file Form 1120, and all European corporations file proper 
forms with respect to their country of incorporation. 
B.  Tax Law and Policy of the Liberal State 
German sociologist Max Weber, who theorized about modernity and 
rationalism, wrote that “a stable system of taxation is the precondition for 
the permanent existence of bureaucratic administration.”13 With the rise of 
progressive individual and corporate taxation to fund World War I, the 
subsequent administrative expansion in the United States, and the 
rebuilding efforts in Europe following World War II, the twentieth century 
experienced a drastic need for increased state revenues and the tools to 
                                                          
 8 Do Higher Taxes Encourage Tax Avoidance?, FOX BUS. (May 13, 2011), 
https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/do-higher-taxes-encourage-tax-avoidance. 
 9 See What other countries use return-free tax filing?, TAX POL. CTR., https://www.tax 
policycenter.org/briefing-book/what-other-countries-use-return-free-tax-filing (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019). 
 10 Rocky Mengle, Tax Day 2019: When’s the Last Day to File Taxes?, KIPLINGER (Apr. 
11, 2019), https://www.kiplinger.com/article/taxes/T056-C005-S001-tax-day-2019-when-s-
the-last-day-to-file-taxes.html. 
 11 See LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE 
RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX, 2-3 (2013). These virtues preclude the values of the 
fourteen-line postcard-sized tax returns that were called for leading up to the 2017 Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act. The tax reform, however, eventually resulted in one postcard-sized return with 
six supplemental worksheets. See also Robert C. Williams, Ryan’s Deceptively Simple 
Promise of Postcard Tax Filing, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jun. 27, 2016), https://www.taxpolicy 
center.org/taxvox/ryans-deceptively-simple-promise-postcard-tax-filing. 
 12 What Other Countries Use Return-Free Tax Filing?, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-other-countries-use-return-free-tax-
filing (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 13 MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 208 (H. H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills eds., 1946)(emphasis in original). 
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acquire such revenues. 
As the United States boosted its social programs and implemented 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Social Security in 1935, Johnson’s “Great Society” 
programs like Medicaid in 1965 and Medicare in 1966, and Nixon’s 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, the welfare state and the 
public’s dependence on it expanded. Hand-in-hand with public dependence 
came popularity across ideological lines, instituting a lock-in effect where 
each program and institution became increasingly salient in the taxpayer’s 
mind with every passing year.14 Across the Atlantic, France instituted a 
public health insurance program in 1945, and the United Kingdom followed 
by establishing the National Health Service and universal healthcare in 
1948. Across Europe, a similar phenomenon occurred over the next twenty 
to thirty years, creating the political economy of the welfare state.15 While 
wildly popular, these programs aroused tensions within their societies, 
causing a “welfare-state backlash” that persists until the present and makes 
the funding of social programs much more politically capital intensive.16 
Beyond balancing its distribution of obligations and rights with respect 
to modern welfare state, new global problems challenge tax policy experts 
across Europe and the United States. Climate change alone is estimated to 
cause $16 trillion in damages with the vast majority of the monetary harm 
falling on the United States, Europe, and other developed nations with great 
wealth and high physical asset prices.17 Automation poses a serious threat 
to social welfare programs already financially strained by accumulated 
welfare-backlash: leading consulting firm McKinsey has projected that one-
third of U.S. workers could face technological unemployment by 2030 with 
a similar trend worldwide.18 Additionally, massive corporations like 
Walmart have sustained low wages with the intention of its low-income 
employees getting taxpayer subsidies from social programs.19 
                                                          
 14 According to an April 2015 poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 83%, 
77%, and 63% of respondents believed that social security, Medicare, and Medicaid, 
respectively, were “very important.” Mira Norton, Bianca DiJulio & Mollyann Brodie, 
Medicare and Medicaid at 50, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (July 17, 2015), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/poll-finding/medicare-and-medicaid-at-50/. Even low tax and 
budget slashing Republicans have become wary of attacking social security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid. See Glenn Kessler, Are Republicans Seeking to ‘Get Rid of Medicare, Medicaid 
and Social Security’?, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2018/10/23/are-republicans-seeking-get-rid-medicare-medicaid-social-security/. 
 15 Eleanor Beardsley, Can the European Welfare State Survive?, NPR (July 14, 2010), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128485416. 
 16 Douglas A. Hibbs & Henrik Jess Madsen, Public Reactions to the Growth of Taxation 
and Government Expenditure, 33 WORLD POL. 413, 413 (1981). 
 17 The Costs of Climate Inaction, NATURE (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.nature.com/ 
articles/d41586-018-06827-x. 
 18 See Thomas Franck, McKinsey: One-third of US Workers Could be Jobless by 2030 
Due to Automation, CNBC (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/one-third-
of-us-workers-could-be-jobless-by-2030-due-to-automation.html. 
 19 AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS, WALMART ON TAX DAY: HOW TAXPAYERS SUBSIDIZE 
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1. Obligations: Raising Revenue 
With the understanding that tax law and policy in large part revolves 
around funding the modern welfare state and will certainly be necessary to 
mitigate or compensate for harm from automation, global warming, and 
underfunded social programs, it is important to understand the mechanics of 
raising revenue. For individuals, three types of taxes usually apply: income, 
property, and consumption. Income is usually divided into three categories: 
first, income derived from an individual’s capital; second, income earned 
from an individual’s wages or other sources; third, income produced by 
corporations. These three categories frequently have differing tax rates, 
sometimes with and other times without elements of progressive taxation. 
Property taxes might be collected locally or nationally depending on the 
country. As for consumption taxes, they are gathered locally in the United 
States and nationally through a value-added tax (“VAT”) in Europe. 
Below, Table 1 documents the taxes collected by the United States, 
Germany, Sweden, France, and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) average along with various other 
developed nations.20 Notably, the United States receives very little revenue 
from consumption taxes.21 A lack of VAT taxes accounts for almost all the 
difference between the United States’ 25.9% tax to GDP ratio and the 
34.2% OECD average tax to GDP ratio (an 8.3% differential). With respect 
to the sum of “personal income taxes” and “corporate income taxes” in 
terms of GDP percentages, the United States collects a comparable 
percentage to Germany, Sweden, France, and the OECD average. With the 
enactment of the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), which lowered the 
corporate tax rate to 21% and gave pass-through entities a 20% deduction 
on qualified business income (“QBI”) through section 199A of the Internal 
Revenue Code, new data will likely lower U.S. corporate income tax 
receipts that further lag behind the OECD average.22 
                                                                                                                                      
AMERICA’S BIGGEST EMPLOYER AND RICHEST FAMILY 3-4 (2014), 
https://americansfortaxfairness.org/files/Walmart-on-Tax-Day-Americans-for-Tax-Fairness-
11.pdf. Coupled with stagnant real wages, low-skilled employees face dire circumstances 
with little leverage. Drew Desilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely 
Budged in Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/. 
 20 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) is an 
intergovernmental economic organization with 36 member countries that attempts to 
establish international economic norms through evidence-based solutions. Who We Are, 
OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/(last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 21 See Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come From?, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jun. 20, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-
basics-where-do-federal-tax-revenues-come-from. 
 22 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001(a) (2017); Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11011(a); Kate Davidson, U.S. Tax Revenues Fall, Deficit 
Widens in Wake of New Tax Law, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/u-s-tax-revenue-declined-0-4-in-2018-11550084426. 
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Table 1. International Comparison of Taxes as a % of GDP, 201423 
 
 
 
Even without a VAT tax and lower overall tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP, the United States incurred a deficit no worse than 
Europe’s worst offenders in 2017. As a percentage of GDP, the United 
States ran a 3.4% deficit.24 In comparison, the United Kingdom ran a 3.6% 
deficit, France had a 2.7% deficit, and Spain held a 3.3% deficit.25 Still, this 
performance leaves a great deal to be desired and stands in stark contrast 
with Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Greenland, which all netted 
surpluses.26 Given the United States’ lower revenue as a percentage of 
GDP, this means that the United States runs a proportionately smaller 
welfare state and could see sizable surpluses if it retained the current size of 
its welfare state and matched its tax revenues with the OECD average. 
Generally, a country running a deficit or surplus is not necessarily an 
indication of the public support for that country’s government.27 
Conceptually, debt was created to foster growth and expand the buying 
power of an actor who lacked the current assets to make a purchase. In 
other words, debt is a growth vehicle. While countries can run surpluses by 
                                                          
 23 Ajay K. Mehrotra, T.S. Adams and the Beginning of the value-Added Tax, N.Y.U. 
TAX POL’Y COLLOQUIUM 3 tbl.1 (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/upload_documents/T.S.%20Adams%20and%20the%20Beginning%20of%20the
%20Value-Added%20Tax%20-%20Mehrotra.pdf. 
 24 The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2222.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See Andrew Kohut, Debt and Deficit: A Public Opinion Dilemma, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Jun. 14, 2012), https://www.people-press.org/2012/06/14/debt-and-deficit-a-public-opinion-
dilemma/. 
 
Mexico Korea USA Canada Japan
OECD
Average
Germany Sweden France
Total Taxes/ % GDP 15.2 24.6 25.9 31.2 32 34.2 36.6 42.8 45.5
Income, Profits Taxes* 5.7 7.2 12.3 15 10.2 11.5 11.4 14.9 10.8
Personal Income Taxes 3 4 10.2 11.3 6.1 8.4 9.6 12.2 8.5
Corporate Income Taxes 2.6 3.2 2.2 3.3 4.1 2.8 1.7 2.7 2.3
Consumption Taxes 5.4 7.4 4.5 7.2 6.3 11 10.1 12.1 11
Value Added Taxes 3.9 4.2 0 4.2 3.9 6.8 7 9 6.9
Sales Taxes 0 0 2 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0
Other^ 1.5 3.2 2.5 2.9 2.4 4.1 3.1 3.1 4.1
Payroll and Workforce Taxes 0.4 0.1 0 0.6 0 0.4 0 4.5 1.6
Property Taxes 0.3 2.7 2.8 3.7 2.7 1.9 1 1.1 3.9
Social Security Contributions 3.1 6.6 6.2 4.7 12.7 9.1 13.9 9.9 17
Unallocable Taxes# 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.1 0.2 0 0 1.1
Table 1. International Comparison of Taxes as a % of GDP, 2014
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making revenues outstrip receipts, there may be an argument that those 
countries should be running deficits instead. In some cases, short-term 
deficits can allow for meaningful growth at a faster and more sustainable 
rate than the gains of reducing national debt with a surplus. At the same 
time, if a country is continually running deficits but has a stagnant growth 
pattern, it may face long-term fiscal problems. This is all to say that surplus 
and deficit figures should not be construed as an indicator of the overall 
financial stability of a country. Instead, the above surpluses and deficits 
should be read in conjunction with Table 1 in order to stroke the 
imagination of what adjusting specific mechanisms of a country’s tax 
structure might do for its ability to meet its current receipts. 
In large part, Europe has been able to meet its revenue needs and hold 
a comparably low corporate tax rate when compared to the pre-TCJA rate 
due to its VAT, which subsidized revenue shortfalls from lowering their 
corporate and individual rates. Noticeably, the United States does not have 
a VAT to subsidize the cutting of its corporate rate to 21% and its 199A 
deduction on QBI for pass-through entities.28 For U.S. policy makers, this 
begs the question whether a VAT is necessary in the United States. If not, 
then either the welfare state has to be drastically reduced against public 
support, or new systems of taxation need to be implemented to stabilize the 
U.S. fiscal state. 
In recent years, the United States has worked with its European 
partners, as part of the G20, and the OECD to address base erosion and 
profit sharing (“BEPS”) schemes used by multinational entities to move 
revenue to low-tax jurisdictions and reduce their tax liabilities.29 Some 
solutions to BEPS look like the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income 
(“GILTI”) and Base Erosion Anti-abuse Tax (“BEAT”).30 Other theorists 
have proposed reworking capital taxation and eliminating both corporate 
income, dividend, and other capital gains taxes with a flat 0.8% asset tax to 
capture 20% of the long-term appreciation of capital.31 It is unclear to what 
extent these regimes would shore up the tax avoidance mechanisms of the 
present regime, but they nonetheless point to a field of innovative revenue 
raising solutions for the modern liberal state. 
                                                          
 28 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 22. 
 29 What is BEPS, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about/ (last visited Oct. 10, 
2019). 
 30 GILTI and BEAT establish new minimum taxes to capture (1) profit shifted to lower-
taxed regimes through intellectual property and (2) related-party payments that are 
tantamount to aggressive profit sharing. BEAT alone is expected to raise $149.6 billion from 
2018-2027. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can Marked-Up Services Skip the 
BEAT?, TAX NOTES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-reform/economic-
analysis-can-marked-services-skip-beat. 
 31 A flat capital tax on securities equivalent to 0.8% of security’s value would 
theoretically make BEPS activity irrelevant, as the gains reaped from that activity should be 
reflected in the value of the corporation’s underlying security. Mark P. Gergen, How to Tax 
Capital, 70 TAX L. REV. 1, 31 (2016). 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 40:123 (2019) 
132 
Though, of course, as T.S. Adams suggests, it is possible to spoil the 
income tax system if those burdened with the obligation to pay do not see 
the goals of the system as legitimate.32 Underlying all politically salient tax 
reform, individuals and corporate special interests compete to subdue the 
other. These powerful lobbies define what constitutes both a worthwhile 
reason to raise taxes and to lower them. In the United States, the TCJA 
highlights this tension.33 Overall, in spite of any tension with respect to 
where national tax systems should go from here, there must lie at least some 
benefit for the taxpayer in this bargain with the state. Otherwise, a social 
contract would not have been entered. 
2. Rights: Tax Benefits 
Across Europe and the United States, various general tax benefits are 
conferred to individuals. To name a few, public healthcare, home buying 
subsidies, renewable energy subsidies, and mass transportation are 
prevalent in the twenty-first century.34 For the average taxpayer, these 
benefits are easily understood and accessible rights that are the result of a 
social contract with the state. Not all individuals will utilize every right 
annually or even in the individual’s lifetime, but they remain available 
options. Consequently, when the taxpayer considers his or her arrangement 
with the state, he or she must place a weight on the availability of all 
available rights. A taxpayer’s value of rights is likely elastic with use, but in 
some instances, taxpayers might support provisions that are unlikely to ever 
benefit them directly.35 
Still, subtler but equally significant benefits exist for individual 
taxpayers within a country’s tax code. Even though a code section might 
                                                          
 32 For a more fundamental understanding of the founding of the U.S. domestic and 
international tax system and one of its visionaries, T.S. Adams, see Mehrotra, supra note 23, 
at 2 & 19. See also Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1039 (1997). 
 33 According to survey data from the Roper Center iPoll Databank at Cornell University, 
54% of Americans stated that “reducing income taxes for all Americans” was “very 
important” to them but only 39% of respondents approved of the TCJA. See Karlyn 
Bowman, Public Opinion on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, TAX NOTES (Jul. 9, 2018), 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Bowman-On-the-Margin-July-9-2018-
1.pdf. 
 34 See, e.g., Erin Mundahl, US Still Subsidizing Renewable Energy to the Tune of Nearly 
$7 Billion, INSIDE SOURCES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/us-still-
subsidizing-renewable-energy-to-the-tune-of-nearly-7-billion/ (noting that in 2016, the U.S. 
government spent $14 billion on energy subsidies alone). After the Great Recession in 2008, 
the United States instituted a new homeowner tax credit that ended in 2010. Rickie Houston, 
What Is the First-Time Home Buyer Credit? Does It Still Exist?, SMART ASSET (Jan. 28, 
2019), https://smartasset.com/taxes/first-time-homebuyer-tax-credit. 
 35 See, e.g., Gates Foundation Awards $14.5 Million for Global Healthcare Access, 
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/gates-
foundation-awards-14.5-million-for-global-healthcare-access (discussing the world’ second 
richest person, Bill Gates, supporting access to public healthcare). 
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describe a class of eligible taxpayers, qualified but unsophisticated 
taxpayers are often de facto locked out of these benefits due to the code’s 
complexity, negatively impacting public perception of the code’s 
inclusivity and public support for the administrative regime. For instance, 
the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) and charitable deduction 
provisions “encourage civic and political participation” by communicating 
that poor individuals, on one hand, ought to have a basic level of income 
and, on the other hand, rich individuals should not be punished by the tax 
code for transferring wealth to society’s neediest.36 These provisions are 
often misunderstood and distorted by the public, getting lost in the former’s 
technical title and labeling the latter as a financially advantageous tax write-
off for the rich.37 These distortionary effects can play a major role in 
increasing and decreasing the demand to weaken, maintain, or bolster 
certain provisions in the code. 
Beyond widely visible and rather obscure benefits, there exists a realm 
of proposed healthcare, education, and other fundamental benefits that has 
existed in Europe for several decades and has recently taken a foothold in 
the United States.38 Some of these benefits overlap or expand on widely 
visible benefits like public education and public healthcare, but some are 
wholly unique. For example, several European countries have begun to 
pilot universal basic income programs–de facto negative income taxes.39 
Other proposed measures include renter’s tax credits, retraining programs, 
and minimum elderly benefits.40 While some of these ideas have existed 
                                                          
 36 ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 68-70. 
 37 The annual cost of the charitable giving tax deduction is approximately $60 billion 
with two-thirds of the rewards going to US households earning more than $200,000. In 
2017, only 0.35% of the bottom 20% of Americans used the charitable giving tax deduction 
with most Americans in that tax bracket not able to file itemized deductions that exceed the 
$6,000 standard deduction. With a doubling of the standard deduction, the charitable giving 
tax deduction is even more inaccessible to low and middle-income households. Dan Kopf, 
US tax reformers should get rid of the charitable deduction, QUARTZ (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://qz.com/1092737/us-tax-reformers-should-get-rid-of-the-charitable-deduction-too-
bad-they-wont/. 
 38 In 2017, New York established the Excelsior Scholarship for qualified low-income 
residents to receive free tuition at New York community colleges. See Ashley A. Smith, 
Free Impact on N.Y. Community Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/10/13/impact-new-yorks-free-tuition-program-
two-community-colleges; Ashley A. Smith, Tens of Thousands of Adults Line Up for Free 
College in Tennessee, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.insidehighered. 
com/news/2018/08/24/tennessee-sees-thousands-apply-tuition-free-adult-plan (Tennessee 
provides tuition- free community college education for qualifying adults). 
 39 Tracy Brown Hamilton, The Netherlands’ Upcoming Money-for-Nothing Experiment, 
THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 21, 2016), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/netherlands-
utrecht-universal-basic-income-experiment/487883/. See also A.T.G., A Negative Income 
Tax in The Netherlands? A General and Emancipatory Point of View, 18 J. ECON. STUD. 105 
(1991); Nicole E.M. de Jager, et al., A Negative Income Tax in a Mini-Welfare State: A 
Simulation Exercise With MIMIC, 18 J. OF POL. MODELING 223 (1996). 
 40 In 2018, U.S. Senator Kamala Harris proposed a tax credit for renters earning below 
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since at least the 1960s, they have come to the forefront with increasing 
Western inequality.41 
On the corporate side, where taxpayers are more sophisticated, there 
exists a wide array of benefits that are guaranteed under the corporate tax 
regime. In the U.S. code, for instance, sections 351 and 368 allow taxpayers 
to change the form but not the substance of their capital in either the 
formation or reorganization of a corporation without incurring tax 
consequences.42 While these provisions are likely to benefit the newly 
founded corporations or the highly complex ones, other provisions assist 
business entities with statuses somewhere in between. Section 1012 
promotes the investment in small business stock through capital gain 
exclusion from gross income, nudging capital flows away from the long-
established and the middle market corporations into the mom and pop 
sector.43 
However, the conceptualization of this benefit structure from the 
ground up is no more than a useless theoretical exercise that does not help 
further the understanding of the social contract entered between the 
taxpayer and the government. Under the status quo, the benefits theory 
largely ignores the lock-in effect, the idea that tax policy is path-dependent 
and the longer a provision or rate exists the more likely that this provision 
or rate will endure.44 Accepting the lock-in effect, the new status quo 
supposes that the current benefits are the result of a bargain where 
consideration and mutual assent have already been achieved. For 
obligations or rights to change, a new contract must be formed with the 
                                                                                                                                      
$100,000 annually and spending more than 30 percent of their income on rent and utilities. 
In Europe, Sweden uses a 0.3% payroll tax to fund “Job Security Councils” that provides 
transition services to “redundant” employees. See Thomas K. Grose, The Worker Retraining 
Challenge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
countries/articles/2018-02-06/what-sweden-can-teach-the-world-about-worker-retraining. 
 41 The OECD measured the top earning decile’s and the bottom earning decile’s average 
annual percentage change in real income among its member states from the mid-1980s to the 
late-2000s. The United States had 0.1% growth in the bottom decile and 1.5% in the top 
decile. Sweden, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom also all had greater growth in the 
top decile, pushing the OECD difference between top and bottom decile growth to 0.6%. An 
Overview of Growing Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Main Findings, OECD 23 
(2011), https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf. 
 42 Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code exempts taxpayers from taxation for 
contributions of capital to a corporation in exchange for stock if the taxpayer controls 80% 
of the voting and non-voting stock immediately after. Section 368(a)(1)(A)-(G) provides 
seven types of tax-free reorganizations. See I.R.C. §§ 351, 368 (LEXIS current through Pub. 
L. 116-56). 
 43 See Id. at § 1012, et seq. (LEXIS current through Pub. L. 116-63). 
 44 An example of lock-in is the failure of the United States to adopt the VAT that every 
other industrialized nation in the world uses, despite the intellectual foundation of the VAT 
being laid in the United States. The eschewing of the VAT in the Revenue Act of 1921, by 
Roosevelt during World War II, and various times since has led to a dependence on income 
taxation, both individual and corporate, and an aversion to a federal-level consumption tax. 
See AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE 376-383(2013). 
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taxpayer. Tax policy as a modification of a previously formed contract fails 
to recognize generational shifts and a general lack of continuity in 
demographics. The state is no longer negotiating with the same parties, and 
the priorities of the state itself are fundamentally different. 
This new vantage embraces diverse vehicles that might seem facially 
contradictory to achieve the same interest under the old status quo. When 
corporate tax brackets originated, Europe and the United States were 
seeking revenue streams to finance costly world wars.45 After the war, these 
contracts continued with the assumption that the revenue stream would 
continue to support the public through government bureaucracy.46 In sum, 
the contract with corporations was to provide a service to the public with 
the first service being wartime national security and the second post-war 
public welfare. Under the old approach, downward adjustments to the 
corporate tax would constitute an undermining of the public welfare. 
However, rationales for the drastic decrease in U.S. corporate tax rates in 
the 2017 TCJA were rooted in the promotion of public welfare through the 
growth of the U.S. economy.47 
When thrown together, policy makers, individuals, and corporations 
battle each other to secure the best benefits for their ideological or 
technocratic camp. These ongoing negotiations represent a balancing act 
between adjusting the government’s social contract with older generations 
and forging a new contract with younger generations of individuals and 
corporate leadership. Internally distorted by generational divides, rifts 
within generations, and the varying transparency of benefits in the code to 
taxpayers, tax law and policy is subject to one final external distortion: 
geopolitical expenditure. 
3. Determining Ethical Behavior 
Considering the United States’ unique and extremely high military 
spending as a percentage of GDP, topped only by countries like Russia, 
Ukraine, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, the idealistic notion of Pax Americana 
has driven the United States to militarily position itself across the world and 
                                                          
 45 AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE 15-17(2013). 
 46 Id. at 17. 
 47 Proponents of the TCJA claim that the pre-TCJA statutory corporate tax rate of 35% 
hindered economic growth against European peers with the highest marginal rates near 20%. 
See Casey Mulligan, At 21 or 20 Percent, New Corporate Tax Rate Will Boost US Economy, 
THE HILL (Dec. 18, 2017), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/365400-at-21-or-20-new-
corporate-tax-will-boost-us-economy. Detractors of this viewpoint hold that U.S. effective 
corporate tax rates were never near the statutory level and already hovered near those of its 
European peers. See Actual U.S. Corporate Tax Rates Are in Line with Comparable 
Countries, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.cbpp. 
org/research/federal-tax/actual-us-corporate-tax-rates-are-in-line-with-comparable-
countries. 
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ensure the safety of international shipping lanes.48 This presence seemingly 
details a moral right and obligation to pay in the fiscal contract between 
citizens and the government to increase international soft power and 
provide for global security. If a sort of global fiscal citizenship exists, with 
an effectively subsidized European defense budget, Europeans and their 
governments might have an obligation to support stability in their states 
through education, healthcare, and other taxation and welfare spending. 
These propositions circle the root of a more fundamental and 
important question: to what extent can rights and obligations be withheld by 
and from the taxpayer and the state? This question is at the center of 
defining fiscal citizenship between the state and both individuals and 
corporations. If a citizen could withhold taxes from the state because the 
citizen does not agree with the approach of the current presidential 
administration, certainly the state could not provide the stability needed to 
serve its citizens. In the same vein, if the state could withhold services to 
certain arbitrarily chosen populations, surely those populations would not 
contribute to the stability of the fiscal state. This tension, which could easily 
turn into a vicious cycle of distrust, underlies fiscal citizenship. Without a 
certain level of faith by the state in citizens and by citizens in the state, the 
whole ceases to work. 
Somewhere between complete withholding of benefits by the state and 
obligations by citizens, there is a point in which each side breaches its 
ethical obligation to the other. If an individual finds $10 on the ground, few 
would claim it an ethical breach to not report it as income to the state. At 
the same time, if the state cancelled the annual firework show due to 
inclement weather, few could claim that the state has breached its ethical 
responsibility to provide benefits. As a framework, I propose one standard 
represented two different ways to represent the ethical bright line for the 
state and for taxpayers: corporate and individual. 
1) If the aggregate actions of taxpayers committing a specific type 
of tax avoidance, whether legal or illegal, materially limits the 
government’s ability to gather revenue to pay for the lowest-cost 
essential taxpayer benefit, then the taxpayer has breached an ethical 
duty. 
2) If the government fails to provide material funding for a 
preestablished essential public benefit that was not eliminated at the 
                                                          
 48 In 2017, the United States spent 3.7% of its GDP on military expenditure, compared 
to the 1.5% average across the European Union. When European countries were grouped 
differently, the differences were largely the same. Central Europe and the Baltics clocked in 
at 1.6%, and Europe and Central Asia clocked in at 1.7%. Only when high income European 
countries were excluded did expenditure come close at 3.1%, but that is likely due to the 
increasing returns to scale. Military Expenditure (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?view=chart (last visited Sept. 
28, 2019). 
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behest of taxpayers, then the government has breached its ethical 
duty. 
4. Assessing Penalties 
If parties conduct unethical behavior, it is uncontroversial to assert that 
the parties ought to face repercussions. In the case of constitutional 
citizenship questions, a party may simply be deported. The controversial 
task is determining the degree of punishment. Obviously, deportation is not 
and ought not be the punishment for violating fiscal citizenship. It would 
verge on absurdity to deport even a tourist, let alone a corporation, for 
failing to pay a $0.07 bag tax at the grocery store while still taking a bag. 
Even the most skillful tax dodgers who pass through the United States 
become fiscal citizens at some point in time, whether that be by paying 
taxes on airfare into the country, sales tax on a bag of chips, or employment 
taxes through temporary work. With this broad base of fiscal citizens and 
the absurdity of draconian punishments for tax evasion in mind, 
governments need a range of proportionate civil and criminal punishments 
to reasonably enforce fiscal citizenship. 
In this section, I want to first lay out the common types of penalties on 
both the criminal and civil side. I then want to discuss the effects that these 
penalties have on individuals and corporations. After that, I want to briefly 
talk about innovative penalties that have been proposed to more accurately 
reflect how fiscal citizenship has been cheated and the extent that it has 
been cheated. The currently administrated penalties originate from the 
various revenue codes of each nation and their criminal statutes. Tax 
scholars, philosophers, economists, and historians have written extensively 
on their efficacy. 
In the United States, there are both criminal and civil penalties, 
enforced by state governments, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”). These penalties range from jail time to monetary fines. In the case 
of undistributed accumulated earnings, the taxpayer is required to pay the 
federal government 20% of all earnings that were undistributed by the 
business entity and that should have been distributed.49 Tax evasion, which 
is estimated to have cost the U.S. government $3.44 trillion from 2001-
2010, can come with a prison sentence of up to five years and a monetary 
penalty of $100,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corporations.50 While 
                                                          
 49 Section 532 of the Internal Revenue Code applies only to shareholders attempting to 
use their corporate entity as a means of avoiding taxation either to gain taxation at a 
preferable rate in the future or pass on the corporation with a stepped-up basis at death. 
I.R.C. § 532 (current through Pub. L. 116-56). 
 50 I.R.C. § 7201 (current through Pub. L. 116-56); While tax evasion cost the U.S. 
government $3.44 trillion over a decade, it is estimated that tax evasion costs governments 
$3.1 trillion or 5.1% of the global GDP annually. Julia Werdigier, Tax Evasion Costs 
Governments $3.1 Trillion Annually, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2011), 
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the government had hoped that these penalties would deter tax evasion, the 
scope of annual tax evasion is still roughly equal to a year’s worth of 
corporate income tax revenue ($35 billion).51 In other words, full 
compliance would be equivalent to doubling the corporate income tax. 
In Europe, tax fines can be quite large, much larger than those levied 
in the United States. For example, in 2016, the European Commission 
levied a $15(€13) billion fine on Apple for taking advantage of illegal tax 
benefits from 2003-2014 in Europe’s tax haven: Ireland.52 Other global 
giants, like Amazon, Google, and Starbucks, have also found themselves in 
the crosshairs of the European Commission with fines ranging from the 
hundreds of millions to billions in U.S. dollars.53 While the desire to curb 
tax evasion is a sound policy principle practiced by the European 
Commission and its member states, its target selection can sometimes be 
borne out of political pressure, not other rational measures like the ability 
and likelihood to pay the fine or the difficulty to prove a convincing case.54 
Each member state chooses how and whether to assess criminal 
punishment for tax crimes. In some member states, like France, tax crimes 
are prosecuted very narrowly. In France, a complaint needs to be filed and 
then the tax administration has to assent to the complaint being investigated 
any further.55 Conversely, in Germany, it is mandatory to prosecute all tax 
crimes. If the prosecutor’s office and police find sufficient evidence of 
illegality, they must move forward and prosecute.56 This bottom-up 
approach where law enforcement and prosecutors are required to lead the 
way is the inverse of France’s top-down expert-driven discretionary system. 
As such, both systems represent the far ends of the criminal tax spectrum in 
Europe. 
                                                                                                                                      
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/business/global/26iht-tax26.html?mtrref=www.goo 
gle.com. 
 51 Total corporate income tax receipts for 2015, the last year for which data is available, 
were just under $342 billion. Federal Revenue: Where Does the Money Come From, NAT’L 
PRIORITIES PROJECT, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/ 
revenues/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 52 Romain Dillet, Apple started paying $15 billion European tax fine, TECH CRUNCH 
(May 19, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/19/apple-started-paying-15-billion-euro 
pean-tax-fine/. 
 53 For a more wholistic view on fines assessed by the European Union, See Joon Ian 
Wong, How to keep track of the billions in penalties the EU is slapping on global 
companies, QUARTZ (Oct. 4, 2017), https://qz.com/1094137/amazon-eu-taxes-how-to-keep-
track-of-all-the-eus-major-tax-and-antitrust-decisions/. 
 54 Reuters, EU Reps Admit That the $14.5 Billion Apple Tax Bill Was ‘Political’, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/05/eu-apple-tax-political/. 
 55 European Parliamentary Research Serv., Member States’ Capacity to Fight Tax 
Crimes: Ex-Post Impact Assessment, PE 603.257, at 48-49 (July 2017). 
 56 Id. at 48-50. 
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5.  Determining Tribunal 
In the United States, businesses and individuals go through several 
tribunals, depending on the nature of their issue and preference of the 
litigant: the IRS, state trial and appellate courts, the U.S. Tax Court, District 
Courts, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Court of Appeals, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In Europe, there are regional, national, and E.U.-based 
tribunals. This section outlines (1) those tribunals’ authority (e.g. binding 
vs. non-binding and regional vs. national) and (2) their effectiveness in 
levying and collecting the aforementioned civil penalties against individuals 
and corporations and enforcing criminal penalties against persons. 
An unusually high number of courts can hear tax issues in the United 
States and render binding judgments. If a tax question is a state or local tax 
issue, then the claim will originate in state courts, unless there is a direct 
federal constitutional issue, and can be appealed directly from the state’s 
highest court to the U.S. Supreme Court. This process is identical to that of 
a standard state law claim. Tax tribunals differentiate themselves on the 
federal level, where a taxpayer can bring a claim in a U.S. District Court, 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”), or the U.S. Tax Court 
(“USTC”). Unlike in a district court or the CFC, taxpayers do not need to 
have paid their assessed tax liability before bringing suit in the USTC.57 
Still, there is a significant amount of tax litigation that goes on outside of 
the USTC. According to the CFC, approximately 10% of its cases are tax 
refund litigation.58 In large part, this is due to the CFC and district courts 
having authority over the USTC in refund litigation if it gains jurisdiction in 
same taxable year.59 
To get a broader sense of how taxpayers choose their tribunal, it is 
important to look at both the number of cases brought in front of the 
tribunals and the dollars in dispute. In 2007, 29,040 cases were in dispute 
with the USTC, 800 with district courts, and 500 with the CFC.60 On a per 
capita basis, $799,319 was the average dispute in front of the USTC, 
$6,875,000 in front of district courts, and $5,400,000 in front of the CFC.61 
                                                          
 57 About the Court, U.S. TAX COURT (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.ustax 
court.gov/about.htm. 
 58 Statistical Report For the Fiscal Year October 1, 2017 - September 30, 2018, U.S. 
COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov 
/sites/default/files/Statistical%20Report%20for%20FY2018.pdf. I.R.C. § 1491 (2018) gives 
the CFC authority to hear refund litigation. Filing a petition to the Tax Court, where 97% of 
tax litigation is heard, precludes the ability to bring those claims in front of the CFC or a 
district court for the disputed year(s). See Elizabeth Chao & Andrew R. Roberson, Overview 
of Tax Litigation Forums, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.tax 
controversy360.com/2017/04/overview-of-tax-litigation-forums/. 
 59 See Gerald A. Kafka, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation (Part 1), THE 
PRAC. TAX LAW., Winter 2011, at 56. 
 60 Id. at 60. 
 61 The results were derived by dividing the 2007 dollars in dispute number by the 2007 
number of cases in dispute: Tax Court ($23.5 billion/29,400), district courts ($5.5 
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These figures indicate that statutory inertia pushing refund litigation to 
district courts and the CFC makes them the avenues of choice (or, perhaps, 
necessity) for corporations. 
Ignoring a tax penalty could lead to the forced closure of a corporation 
or even more severe penalties and possible criminal charges. An important 
mechanism to make sure that taxpayers even make it to the tribunal stage, 
which has the full effect of the law and government to enforce penalties, the 
U.S. audit regime polices the giant corporate actors that use sophisticated 
tax-free or low-tax vehicles like the “Double Irish with a Dutch 
Sandwich.”62 The audit regime in the U.S., however, has declined in recent 
years. As recently as 2010, corporations with $20 billion or more in assets 
filed 447 tax returns and 431 were audited (96.4%).63 Yet, in 2017, at 331 
audits, 100 less corporations with $20 billion or more in assets were audited 
despite the number of filers rising from 169 to 616.64 The effective audit 
rate for 2017, consequently, was 53.7%. Audit time, a unit measure of 
2,000 revenue agent audit hours, also fell during that time period from 613 
to 311.65 
In Europe, each nation has its own tax tribunal. Denmark’s Customs 
and Tax Tribunal is the forum for prosecuting cases brought by the Danish 
Tax Agency, the Tax Appeals Agency (“TAA”), and the Danish Customs 
and Tax Administration. Specifically, the TAA files cases involving 
“taxation, VAT, duties, customs duty, collection of public debts and 
property assessment.”66 The TAA transitions the tax issue from a generic 
district tribunal to a regional appeals board and then finally to the National 
Tax Tribunal. 
Some countries, however, do not render an initial judgment through 
their judiciary. In England, an administrative agency–usually Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs, Border Force, the National Crime Agency, or the 
Welsh Revenue Authority–renders judgment on the tax issue at hand before 
it can be appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal, a special tribunal established 
in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.67 England allows for 
                                                                                                                                      
billion/800), CFC ($2.7 billion/500). Id. 
 62 For a more detailed explanation of the “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” vehicle 
and how it uses tax havens and mismatching tax-residence definitions, See ‘Double Irish 
With a Dutch Sandwich’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), https://archive.nytimes.com/www. 
nytimes.com/interactive/2012/04/28/business/Double-Irish-With-A-Dutch-
Sandwich.html?_r=0. 
 63 TRAC IRS, NEARLY HALF OF CORPORATE GIANTS ESCAPE IRS AUDIT IN 2017, at 1 
(2018), http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/latest/507/. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 1-2. 
 66 About Skatteankestyrelsen, SKATTEANKESTYRELSEN, https://skatteankestyrelsen.dk/ 
english/about-skatteankestyrelsen (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 67 First-tier Tribunal (Tax), GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/first-tier-
tribunal-tax (last visited Oct. 10, 2019); Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, c. 2, s. 
3 (1). 
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the appeal of decisions related to both “indirect” and “direct” taxes.68 The 
former includes “Income Tax, PAYE tax, Corporation Tax, Capital Gains 
Tax, National Insurance contributions, Statutory Sick Pay, Statutory 
Maternity Pay, Inheritance Tax,” while the latter includes VAT, customs, 
and excise taxes.69 If an unsatisfactory decision is rendered in the First-Tier 
Tribunal, the decision can be appealed in the Upper Tribunal.70 
For tax issues arising out of E.U. law, cases can be brought in front of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”). The court consists of 
forty-seven judges and will be increased to fifty-six in 2019 in order to 
ensure each European country has two judges.71 In addition to the 
requirement that a claim arise out of E.U. law, it must also be between E.U. 
institutions or member states; in some instances, individuals, corporations, 
and other organizations can also bring claims. Overall, the CJEU is 
primarily concerned with making national countries apply E.U. law and 
sanctioning E.U. institutions. National courts may defer cases to the CJEU; 
otherwise, the litigant needs to assert a claim that the litigant was directly 
harmed by an E.U. institution.72 
Out of these European systems, three distinctions from the U.S. regime 
are notable. First, there is a clear establishment of national tribunals, even 
in the European Union. Second, these tribunals hear the entire spectrum of 
tax claims, even if special tribunals are required or issues are split up into 
different categorizations (such as direct or indirect tax) through 
administrative regulations or statutes. Third, the E.U. provides a more 
holistic framework for appeal than the United States. Due to the limited 
scope of the CJEU and the difficulty of bringing claims, the forty-seven 
current CJEU judges closed proceedings in only about 760 cases combined 
in 2018.73 
III. THE STATE OF FISCAL CITIZENSHIP 
A. Individual 
In the United States, individuals have become disillusioned with their 
                                                          
 68 Appeal to the Tax Tribunal, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/tax-tribunal (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2018). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery), GOV.UK, https://www.gov. 
uk/tax-upper-tribunal (last visited Nov. 24, 2019); Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 
2007, c. 2, s. 3 (2). 
 71 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUROPA (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Simon Taylor, EU Changes Rules for Appeals Before the Court of Justice, LAW.COM 
(Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.law.com/2019/04/09/european-union-changes-rules-for-appeals-
before-the-eu-court-of-justice-292-43518/. 
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social contract with the modern American fiscal state.74 In turn, the Tea 
Party movement formed in 2009, demanding lower taxation (i.e. current tax 
obligations) and curbing of the national debt (i.e. future tax obligations).75 
The powerful Tea Party movement led to a gain of sixty-three seats in the 
U.S. House of Representatives for Republicans, the largest swing in the 
House since 1948 and the largest midterm swing since 1938. Norway’s 
Progress Party, Hungary’s Jobbik, and the United Kingdom’s Independence 
Party (“UKIP”) reflect the Tea Party influence in Europe.76 While these 
parties are not mere carbon copies of one another, they share the mix of 
nationalism and fundamental anti-modern fiscal state ideologies of the Tea 
Party. 
The Tax Affinity Hypothesis cuts across the fundamental tenets of the 
Tea Party, holding that taxpayers derive some utility from paying taxes.77 
Some researchers have even found that taxpayers respond more negatively 
to a cost when it is labeled as a fee instead of a tax.78 In other words, if the 
taxpayer believes that part of the cost the taxpayer bears is due to an excise 
tax or tax to benefit some part of that taxpayer’s society, then the taxpayer 
is less reticent to pay that cost. 
In essence, this camp is the omega to fiscal citizens’ alpha. The Tea 
Party camp supports lower rates across the board, whether that be on 
individuals or corporations. Some even suggest a flat tax rate, so that no 
taxpayer is taxed differently based on the taxpayer’s compensation.79 On 
                                                          
 74 According to an April 2017 poll conducted by the CBS News, 56% of respondents 
believed that the income tax system was either “somewhat fair” or “quite unfair, the lowest 
levels of the five times CBS News conducted this poll since 1978.” Jennifer De Pinto, Poll – 
Do Americans Think Their Tax System is Fair?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-do-americans-think-their-tax-system-is-fair/. Notably, 
in the 2015 version, 55% “thought corporations paid less than their fair share. Id. 
 75 Amy Gardner & Michael E. Ruane, “Tea Party” Protesters Gather in Washington to 
Rally Against Taxes, Spending, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/15/AR2010041503344.html; see also 
Bill Fortier, Tea Party Faithful Greet Tax Day, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Apr. 
16, 2012), http://www. telegram.com/article/20120416/NEWS/104169961/1160; Jennifer 
Feehan, Tea Partiers Gather in Perrysburg, THE BLADE (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.tole 
doblade.com/local/2014/04/20/Tea-Partiers-gather-in-Perrysburg.html. For more on the Tea 
Party movement, see generally RONALD P. FORMISANO, THE TEA PARTY: A BRIEF HISTORY 
(2012) and THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING 
OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM (2012). 
 76 Europe’s Tea Parties, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.economist.com/ 
leaders/2014/01/02/europes-tea-parties. 
 77 Iwan Djanali & Damien Sheehan-Connor, Tax Affinity Hypothesis: Do We Really 
Hate Paying Taxes?, 33 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 758, 759 (2012). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Senator Rand Paul Releases Flat Tax Plan, COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/senator-rand-paul-releases-flat-tax-plan-0. An 
interesting variant to the regressive flat tax structure is Daniel Hemel’s flat tax rate coupled 
with a demogrant to remove the discriminatory tax effects caused by marital status while 
maintaining a progressive structure. See Daniel Jacob Hemel, Beyond the Marriage Tax 
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the other side, those in favor of fiscal citizenship either believe in 
maintaining the taxation status quo or raising taxes. For raising taxes, this 
might be accomplished through an adjustment of individual or corporate 
brackets or new tax vehicles like GILTI, BEAT, and sometimes even an old 
vehicle like VAT. 
For most governments, it causes alarm if a taxpayer breaks from her 
country and chooses to earn revenue elsewhere or renounce citizenship. 
Surely, this abandonment is not the Tea Party brand of disdain for fiscal 
citizenship but a reallocation of fiscal citizenship. For U.S. taxpayers 
earning income abroad, it is still required that the taxpayer file a tax return 
with the IRS.80 For the first $103,900 of income, however, the taxpayer can 
claim a foreign income earned exclusion.81 This means that the income will 
not be included in the gross income of the taxpayer for the sake of the 
taxpayer’s liability. Any income above the foreign income earned exclusion 
threshold will be subject to both the United States and international tax, but 
the United States will grant a tax credit on all international tax paid by the 
taxpayer.82 
While the European Union has no formalized rules on how to tax the 
income of its member states’ citizens abroad, most European countries can 
usually tax the worldwide income of their expatriates.83 As general 
guidance, under the European bilateral tax treaties, a European expatriate 
should be considered a tax-resident in the country where the taxpayer earns 
“all or almost all” of the taxpayer’s income.84 To avoid double taxation, the 
country of citizenship must forego taxation of a taxpayer’s income if that 
taxpayer is a tax-resident of another country. At the same time, the country 
where the taxpayer is considered a tax-resident must equally apply its 
taxation rules to that taxpayer, even if the taxpayer is not a resident in other 
regards, as to avoid double non-taxation.85 To some extent, this fluidity 
between tax-residence and citizenship residence reflects the post-national 
membership unique to the European Union.86 
                                                                                                                                      
Trilemma, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming)(manuscript at 104-105), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438075. 
 80 Taxpayers Living Abroad, IRS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/individuals 
/international-taxpayers/taxpayers-living-abroad. 
 81 Foreign Earned Income Exclusion, IRS (Jun. 14, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/ 
individuals/international-taxpayers/foreign-earned-income-exclusion. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Income Taxes Abroad, EUROPA (Feb. 25, 2019), https://europa.eu/youreurope 
/citizens/work/taxes/income-taxes-abroad/index_en.htm. 
 84 Id. 
 85 A taxpayer could not gain or retain residency in the United Kingdom if the taxpayer 
did not stay for 183 days in a year or if the taxpayer did not live in the UK for 91 days 
repeatedly across several years, but the taxpayer could still be considered a resident for tax 
purposes under the E.U. framework. See Donald Pearce-Crump, Commonwealth Citizenship 
and British Income Tax Law, 113 S. AFR. L.J. 415, 419 (1996). 
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B. Corporate 
While individual fiscal citizenship has a great deal of literature 
surrounding it, corporate fiscal citizenship is frequently given little 
attention. Corporations are even quite frequently and shockingly seen as 
complicated capital assets that provide an eventual return to the shareholder 
level. Yet, corporations are more than that. Corporations are lifelike 
entities. With more than 50,000 mergers and acquisitions in 2015, 2016, 
and 2017, corporations are becoming increasingly organizationally and 
technically diverse.87 With increased media scrutiny of these giant 
corporations that seem to have a horse in every race, shareholder activism 
has risen.88 With companies being forced out of certain partnerships, how 
has a reckoning of the corporate social conscience affected the corporate 
partnership with the state? 
 
Figure 1: Corporate Tax Levels Pre-TCJA89 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
in Germany, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 330, 333 (2006). 
 87 Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, What the Big Mergers of 2017 Tell Us About 2018, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 28, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/what-the-big-mergers-of-2017-
tell-us-about-2018. 
 88 See Manuel Baigorri & Nishant Kumar, Black Swans, Wolves at the Door: the Rise of 
Activist Investors, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2017-07-12/black-swans-wolves-at-the-door-the-rise-of-activist-investors. 
 89 Niall McCarthy, Global Corporation Tax Levels in Perspective, STATISTA (Aug. 25, 
2016), https://www.statista.com/chart/5594/global-corporation-tax-levels-in-perspective/. 
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Figure 1 shows that before the TCJA, the United States had the highest 
corporate tax rate across North America and Europe. Yet, few Americans 
actually believed that corporations paid their fair share of tax liabilities.90 
Infamous stories circulate year after year about giant corporations paying 
little to no U.S. income tax.91 It would surprise almost no Americans that 
Figure 2 puts the effective American corporate tax rate low among its 
European peers. With the post-TCJA rate, the effective U.S. rate has likely 
dropped even further to a lower level near Austria and Germany. 
 
Figure 2: Effective Corporate Tax Rate (2000-2005)92 
 
Even with the knowledge that corporations are complex, ever-
expanding, and are large revenue contributors to the nation’s fiscal coffers, 
it may not be readily apparent why corporate fiscal citizenship is important. 
                                                          
 90 Frank Newport, Majority Say Wealthy Americans, Corporations Taxed Too Little, 
GALLUP (Apr. 18, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/208685/majority-say-wealthy-
americans-corporations-taxed-little.aspx. 
 91 E.g. Laura Stampler, Amazon Will Pay a Whopping $0 in Federal Taxes on $11.2 
Billion Profits, FORTUNE (Feb. 14, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/02/14/amazon-doesnt-
pay-federal-taxes-2019/. 
 92 Treasury Conference on Business Taxation and Global Competitiveness, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 42, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
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One could argue that individual fiscal citizenship is important because 
individuals need to have faith in elected officials and the government more 
generally. Assuming the good health of the welfare state is in an 
individual’s interest, poor fiscal citizenship would disrupt domestic stability 
and worsen an individual’s life quality. However, that same argument 
cannot be made for corporations. While corporations need regulatory 
agencies and certain legal protections, the state’s failure to provide revenue 
for public education, social security, or some other program is unlikely to 
have any major direct impact. 
Instead, the importance of fiscal citizenship is found through the harms 
that come with the capitalization and subsequent operation of a corporation. 
Through a benefits theory approach, corporate fiscal citizenship should 
necessarily reflect the reality that unique societal responsibilities come from 
large-scale business activities. In asking questions of corporate fiscal 
citizenship, it is necessary to determine the effect of corporations’ negative 
externalities. To get an answer to this inquiry, it is important to look at 
exactly in what social, political, and economic climate corporations 
currently operate across the globe before turning to the tax liabilities of 
corporations.93 
1. New Era of U.S. Tax Policy After the Great Recession 
In 2008, the Great Recession shook the world, causing markets to 
crash, gross domestic product to decline, and unemployment to spike. Six 
years later, only five of the seventy-one countries with publicly available 
quarterly data had avoided a recession.94 Despite being blamed as the 
culprit of this crisis, subprime mortgages were only a symptom of a much 
deeper systematic failure. American economist Ravi Batra argued that 
growing inequality was at fault.95 Across the Atlantic, Scottish economist 
Alisa McKay and Norwegian sociologist Margunn Bjørnholt agreed and 
posited that the only solution to prevent future crises was to reform 
capitalism starting with social responsibility.96 To handle this great task of 
                                                          
 93 It is necessary to understand the cost of the remedies that the government needs to 
take before addressing the taxpayers’ obligations to the government. Governments are not 
incurring the cost of making skies or rivers cleaner for corporations, like they are for 
individuals. The benefit conferred to the corporation is an environment as clean as 
yesterdays to pollute without being destroyed in the process of creating a product. If a 
business destroys the environment needed to make that product, the business can no longer 
operate. 
 94 GDP and Main Components - Volumes: Percentage Change On Previous Quarter, 
OECD, https://data.oecd.org/gdp/quarterly-gdp.htm (adjusted by season and by working 
days) (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 95 Ravi Batra, Weapons of Mass Exploitation, TRUTHOUT (May 8, 2011), https://truth 
out.org/articles/weapons-of-mass-exploitation/. 
 96 MARGUNN BJØRNHOLT & AILSA MCKAY, Advances in Feminist Economics 
in Times of Economic Crisis, in COUNTING ON MARILYN WARING: NEW ADVANCES IN 
FEMINIST ECONOMICS 7, 8-10 (Bjørnholt and McKay eds., 2014). 
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socially responsible reform, the United States and Europe have taken 
drastically different approaches. 
In the United States, the TCJA not only tapped into new revenue 
sources and tightened the grip on evasive old revenue but also redefined 
corporate fiscal citizenship. At the heart of the corporate tax reform were 
two fundamental changes to the tax code: the addition of 199A and the 
overall reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%.97 Essentially, 
it was decided that corporations were paying more than their fair share of 
taxes. While the final rate was increased to 21% from 20% and measures 
were implemented to significantly reduce base erosion, like BEAT and 
GILTI, the revenue shortfall from the TCJA remains overwhelming, adding 
$1.9 trillion in debt over the next decade.98 
Because the United States will have to confront costly economic 
disruptions in the next century, increasing debt is perhaps an unorthodox 
choice. Paired with the fact that most countries use healthy economies to 
pay down debt, this choice signals a departure from the deficit hawk 
moderates of the twentieth century.99 Borrowing, of course, means that the 
United States will have to service its debt well into the future and that some 
future constituency must bear the cost. Given the popular bipartisan tax 
base broadening approach taken under President Reagan in 1986, it is 
unclear whether large corporations will pay for the price of the dramatic tax 
cuts they receive today or if the costs will be passed on to individuals.100 
Regardless of what constituency ends up footing the bill, the TCJA 
serves as an alarming continuation of the “starve the beast” policy that 
Republicans have used to lead an assault on the U.S. welfare state.101 The 
unintended–or perhaps even intended– consequence is that there will be 
little flexibility in providing widespread government retraining programs to 
combat automation and AI, or in offering renewable energy subsidies to 
combat global warming without massive and unpopular future tax hikes. 
With corporate tax rates lower than individual tax rates, it is clear that the 
United States has chosen to deemphasize not the ability to pay but the 
                                                          
 97 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 22. 
 98 Chris Macke, TCJA One Year Later: One Broken Promise After Another, THE HILL 
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/422861-tcja-one-year-later-one-broken-
promise-after-another. 
 99 Andrea Thomas, Germany’s budget surplus set to soar this year, MARKETWATCH 
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/germanys-budget-surplus-set-to-soar-
this-year-2018-12-06. 
 100 During Reagan’s historic Tax Reform Act of 1986, the corporate income tax rate was 
reduced from 50% to 35% and the individual income tax rate was reduced from 50% to 
28%. To fund these tax decreases, the Reagan administration broadened the tax base and 
eliminated numerous deductions and credits, shifting the costs primarily to individuals. See 
ALAN MURRAY & JEFFREY BIRNBAUM, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, 
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1988). 
 101 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND 
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benefits theory principle with respect to corporations. The corollary to this 
proposition is that individuals must bear the greater burden of a changing 
society. 
2. European Reaction 
The European Union took the diametrically opposite route. While 
many member states slashed taxes and issued rebates during the Great 
Recession, the European Union has learned that reducing national debt 
during healthy times is essential to providing stimulus during economic 
downturns.102 In 2009, the European Union had a debt to GDP ratio of 73.3, 
rising year after year to its peak of 86.6 in 2014.103 Every year since 2014, 
which the World Bank labeled as the recession’s turning point,104 has seen a 
decrease in the European Union’s debt to GDP ratio to 81.7 in 2017.105 
While the European banking system still remains in relative disarray 
as member states have had difficulty recapitalizing their insolvent banks, 
economic conditions are dramatically better in the vast majority of both 
Eastern and Western Europe, even if they lag behind U.S. benchmarks.106 
Still, even though the economy is generally improved and overall debt 
levels in the European Union have decreased, member states have not 
uniformly increased taxes to achieve their desired results. Both France and 
Italy raised taxes to reduce deficits, but Ireland, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom cut spending instead.107 This result is not necessarily surprising 
when looking at path-dependent tax policy among European welfare states; 
however, it is noteworthy.108 
Overall, the European Union has stabilized and even reduced its debt 
levels due to successful tax hikes and spending cuts, an approach that 
stands in stark contrast to that of the United States. Until recent years, the 
corporate income tax has played a consistent role in this stabilization and 
debt reduction. 
                                                          
 102 The use of financial institutions along with tax cuts to stimulate the economy is a 
classical Keynesian measure that has become the stalwart of western liberal fiscal 
administration. See generally Sarwat Jahan et al., What is Keynesian Economics?, FIN. & 
DEV., Sept. 2014, at 53. 
 103 European Union Government Debt to GDP, TRADING ECON., https://trading 
economics.com/european-union/government-debt-to-gdp (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 104 Global Economy at a Turning Point, Says World Bank, THE WORLD BANK (Jan. 14, 
2014), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/01/14/global-economy-turn 
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 105 European Union Government Debt to GDP, supra note 103. 
 106 A Decade After the Great Recession, Is the Global Financial System Safer?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 11, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ten-
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DEPENDENCE AND POLICY DIFFUSION 50-52(2009). 
Western Corporate Fiscal Citizenship 
40:123 (2019) 
149 
 
Figure 3: European Union Corporate Income Tax 2009-2018109 
 
 
In 2016, the corporate income tax rate took an unprecedented 
downward turn, departing from already historic low rates. By 2018, it had 
reached its new historic low of 21.3%, a rate nearly identical to the United 
States’ 21% corporate income tax. While the U.S. corporate income tax rate 
was cut from 35% to 21% overnight, the step down from 35% to 21.3% was 
much less dramatic in the European Union, occurring over 21 years.110 
Meanwhile, the U.S. high of 35% existed as recently as 2017. The 
difference in the European Union is that the full corporate tax liability is not 
accounted for by the corporate income tax. The VAT imposes a significant 
liability upon the value added to products by European corporations, raising 
about 7% of a country’s GDP in taxes compared to the approximately 3% 
raised by the corporate income tax.111 
Fiscal stewardship in the European Union has not come at the cost of 
corporate fiscal citizenship. If anything, the European Union’s emphasis on 
the VAT and its robust revenue raising capabilities are better suited for the 
problems of the twenty-first century. Global warming, pollution, and 
automation are either products of excessive consumerism or enablers 
thereof. Forcing a VAT on both consumers and corporations creates a 
powerful revenue stream to directly address these looming and costly 
issues. Moreover, the revenue is not subject to deferral or avoidance 
through complicated international tax planning and arbitrage. There are no 
treaties that can conceivably allow consumers or producers to create the 
                                                          
 109 European Union Corporate Tax Rate, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics. 
com/european-union/corporate-tax-rate (last visited Mar. 16, 2019). 
 110 Id. (select “MAX” under the graph to view the change over 21 years). 
 111 OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS 2018: TAX REVENUE TRENDS IN THE OECD 7 tbl.2 
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infamous double non-taxation that corporations seek. Neither are there 
carve-outs in European tax codes to defer VAT liabilities through 
depreciation or other tax-advantaged mechanisms. A low corporate tax and 
substantial VAT regime still force corporations to internalize the cost of 
some of their externalities. 
The European system is, however, not perfect. While it appears to tax 
corporations through the benefits principle through the VAT, it is only a 
half-hearted approach. The European Union is still also pursuing the 
ability-to-pay theory through general corporate taxation. While a mixed 
solution might be preferable–ability to pay and the benefits principle are 
surely not mutually exclusive–the corporate income tax is an outmoded 
method of achieving the desired results. Deferred tax liabilities through 
depreciation, namely accelerated depreciation, and base erosion have 
resulted in a loss of 4-10% of annual corporate income tax globally.112 
IV. THE PATH TOWARD CORPORATE FISCAL CITIZENSHIP 
Fundamentally, the taxation of capital sits at the heart of corporate 
fiscal citizenship reform. Corporations are the manifestation of individuals’ 
desire to invest and maximize their capital. If the taxation of labor 
allocation is to reflect an individual’s obligation to society and right to 
receive benefits from that society, there is no morally coherent reason to 
exclude an individual’s allocation of capital from like treatment. While the 
taxation of an individual’s labor primarily goes toward supporting labor 
longevity through defense, medical, and education spending, it follows that 
the taxation of capital should go toward supporting capital longevity: roads, 
bridges, and the environment, among others. The taxation of capital is, 
generally, the bedrock of individual capital rights, so cash-strapped nations 
need to consider reworking their capital taxation regimes to make corporate 
fiscal citizens bear costs that mirror those that individual fiscal citizens bear 
for their rights. 
Of course, both the taxation of labor and capital have overlapping 
interests. For instance, education is the foundation of human capital and 
necessary to make efficient labor decisions. Even more advanced areas like 
artificial intelligence create overlap between labor and capital, causing 
declining demand and increasing infrastructure to facilitate capital returns. 
These overlaps are natural and illustrative that no clearly delineated bright 
line exists for the categorization of all rights that individuals receive from 
their labor and capital taxation. The more important point is that, despite the 
overlap, there are two distinct and clearly defined moral mandates linked to 
labor and capital taxation. The latter is the target of the following 
recommendation. 
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In 2019, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed a wealth tax to much 
Democratic fanfare and Republican scorn.113 Under Warren’s proposal, 
households with a net worth between $50 million and $1 billion would pay 
2% of their assets annually in taxes.114 In addition, Warren would levy a 
surtax of 1% on households with net worth in excess of $1 billion.115 While 
Warren’s proposal seems radical, much of the United States already has a 
wealth tax – i.e. property taxation - that frequently goes towards supporting 
education funding and subsequently, human capital. For the United States 
government, this form of capital taxation dates back to the Articles of 
Confederation.116 Warren’s expanded vision is not new either. 
In Europe, the wealth tax found both a twentieth-century resurgence 
and twenty-first century rollback. Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands, among others, have experienced either the introduction or 
the abolishment of a wealth tax in the last fifty years, with the latter 
generally under conservative coalition governments.117 These wealth taxes, 
unlike in the United States, were generally attacked for economic and not 
moral considerations. Capital drain, economic distortions, and 
administrative costs were the prominent claims against preserving a wealth 
tax.118 To a degree, these are valid concerns. Even the most morally 
righteous tax ought not to create economic ruin; such distress would likely 
prove counter-productive to the preservation of capital. 
Of the three claims against the wealth tax, the most serious hurdle is 
avoiding capital drain. Economic distortions and administrative costs are 
inherent to all taxation and can be mitigated. High-information economies 
ease administrative costs, and, in the present case, minimal capital drain 
will ease economic distortions.119 Given that Europe and the United States 
both constitute high-information economies, driving capital drain down is 
the key factor in creating a palatable capital tax. As a general rule, capital 
achieves a 3-5% long-term return, so capital drain exists when either the tax 
                                                          
 113 Adam Shaw, Elizabeth Warren Calls for ‘Wealth Tax’ on Richest Americans, FOX 
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/elizabeth-warren-to-call-for-
wealth-tax-on-richest-americans-report. 
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rate exceeds the 3-5% return range or constitutes a significant enough 
percentage for investors to either consume capital instead of investing it or 
otherwise investing it in a low-capital-tax jurisdiction.120 
Despite popular support, Elizabeth Warren’s proposed tax is unlikely 
to meet the criteria for a palatable wealth tax.121 Warren’s 2% rate on assets 
between $50 million and $1 billion would effectively be a 52% income tax 
on unrealized investment returns and her 3% tax on assets above $1 billion 
would equal a 78% tax on unrealized capital returns.122 A sale of these 
assets for those with $50 million to $1 billion in total assets would be at the 
20% long-term rate and yield a 61.6% tax burden on returns, lowering a 4% 
investment return to 1.57%. Similarly, a sale of these assets for those with 
over $1 billion in total assets would also occur at the highest marginal long-
term capital gains rate of 20% and create total tax burden of 82.4% on 
returns, lowering a 4% long-term investment return to 0.704%.123 At such 
low return rates, there is a very real risk that investors would instead choose 
to consume capital, obscure its value, renounce citizenship, or hide it in an 
international tax haven. 
Despite this setback, the United States and Europe do not need to 
return to square one. If supporters of the capital tax shift their focus from 
the popular imagination to developments in tax academia, a workable 
solution exists. Professor Mark Gergen suggests that a flat 0.8% tax on 
publicly-traded securities would provide enough revenue to eliminate all 
other capital taxation, including the corporate income tax, income tax on 
the sale of all securities, and the individual income tax on all other 
investment or business income.124 Additionally, due to perfect information 
collection of public security prices and the flat nature of the tax, 
administration costs would plummet. Increased distortions are unlikely to 
occur in either the United States or Europe. Gergen’s tax has an effective 
rate of 20% on the 4% long-term investment return, which is similar to 
                                                          
 120 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 164 (2015). Picketty 
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(2014). 
 124 Gergen, supra note 31, at 1. 
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long-term capital gains and corporate income tax rates across Europe and in 
the United States.125 
Comparatively, the Gergen regime is not only economically sensible 
but also morally righteous with respect to the goal of fiscal citizenship 
through taxation of corporate capital. It can have its cake and eat it too. 
Myriads of other tax reform regimes exist, but they normally either falter in 
raising receipts or protect only a miniscule amount of societal capital. 
Notably, three reform regimes have become commonplace in the twenty-
first century: corporate income tax, social tax credits, and penalty regimes. 
With individual ethics bleeding into corporations and shareholder activism 
increasing, Gergen’s regime captures the benefits of all three regimes.126 
First, the corporate income tax regime has forever suffered from base 
erosion and crafty transfer pricing techniques that have allowed 
corporations like Apple to sock billions in income overseas in either low- or 
no-tax jurisdictions, achieving almost permanent tax deferral.127 Increasing 
rates would only promote greater base erosion and lead to more seemingly 
inevitable tax holidays.128 Under the Gergen plan, it would not matter where 
Apple shifts its income because it would have to pay taxes based on the 
value of its issued securities, which account for the positioning of its assets 
and income globally. 
Second, social tax credits and penalty regimes attempt to represent 
                                                          
 125 Kyle Pomerleau, U.S. Taxpayers Face the 6th Highest Top Marginal Capital Gains 
Tax Rate in the OECD, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 24, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/us-taxpayers-
face-6th-highest-top-marginal-capital-gains-tax-rate-oecd/. The U.S. capital gains rate sits at 
23.8% when accounting for federal taxes, 6.4% higher than the OECD’s weighted average. 
 126 See Yuliya Ponomareva, Shareholder Activism is on The Rise: Caution Required, 
FORBES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/esade/2018/12/10/shareholder-
activism-is-on-the-rise-caution-required/. 
 127 Apple was able to successfully defer over $36 billion in tax liabilities, only choosing 
to pay due to a U.S. tax holiday resulting from the TCJA that allows for far reduced tax 
rates. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Brian X. Chen, Apple, Capitalizing on New Tax Law, Plans 
to Bring Billions in Cash Back to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/01/17/technology/apple-tax-bill-repatriate-cash.html. 
 128 Id. In general, tax holidays provide either low-rate or tax-free transfers of untaxed 
income into the jurisdiction in question. For instance, the United States’ repatriation tax 
from the 2017 TCJA has set rates of 15.5% and 8% for the repatriation of untaxed income in 
the form of cash and noncash assets, respectively. Erica York, Evaluating the Changed 
Incentives for Repatriating Foreign Earnings, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://taxfoundation.org/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-repatriation/. Several European countries 
have also implemented tax holidays from time to time. The downside of these holidays is 
that they incentivize long-term deferral of income. Chuck Marr & Chye-Ching Huang, 
Repatriation Tax Holiday Would Lose Revenue and is a Proven Policy Failure, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jun. 20, 2014), https://www.cbpp.org/research/repatriation-
tax-holiday-would-lose-revenue-and-is-a-proven-policy-failure. While a corporate tax 
planner would rather pay the new 21% U.S. corporate rate over the old 35% rate, that same 
planner would rather pay 15.5% or 8% over the new 21% rate. If the corporation in question 
does not have a high demand for either liquidity or capital, such deferral through tax havens 
can prove rewarding. 
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both sides of a coin, heads rewarding social enterprise with credits and tails 
punishing social malfeasance with penalties. In theory, these regimes 
punish for the destruction of capital that corporate pollution and the release 
of greenhouse gases cause, but they rely heavily on litigation and ex post 
information gathering that can be politically and economically difficult. 
Meanwhile, Gergen’s plan offers an ex ante solution that uses ex post 
corrective measures.129 Both forecasts of harm to public goods and the 
actual resulting harm create unwanted downward pressure on security 
prices. 
Because a corporation’s ultimate obligation is to reward investors by 
raising share prices, Gergen’s plan bizarrely inverts the dual penalty-credit 
regime, counterintuitively resulting in better long-term outcomes for public 
capital and generating higher tax receipts. The penalty and credit regime 
focus on harm caused now, but its revenue dries up when harm ceases to 
occur. Gergen’s plan instead plays into the long-term sociology of market 
demand and the psychology of the activist shareholder that seeks higher 
returns and fewer negative externalities.130 Instead of tapping a short-term 
revenue stream from pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, it taps into a 
much larger and longer-term cash cow as activist shareholders and market 
demand push companies to invest in greener energy and punish the stock 
prices of those that do not. Corporations are consequently forced to appease 
their activist shareholders and market demand, investing in less polluting 
and greenhouse gas emitting technology, increasing the value of corporate 
securities, and facing a higher tax liability as a result. 
On its face, bearing an increased cost while moving to cleaner, more 
innovative, and sustainable uses of public capital seems counterintuitive. 
One might think that surely firms who make these shifts deserve lower tax 
rates. That contention might bear some weight if market economics and 
shareholder activism were not sufficiently powerful motivators in 
themselves. Instead, the purpose of increasing tax liabilities as firms 
improve their value through the adoption of new technologies is to increase 
the overall expenditure on capital. A capital tax reform that only replaced 
the revenues of a piecemeal approach dollar-for-dollar with those of a 
comprehensive plan that stopped collecting revenue after firms innovated 
would only maintain the status quo of corporate fiscal citizenship. If firms 
                                                          
 129 When internal corporate forecasts undershoot Wall Street expectations, security prices 
generally fall. See e.g. Wallace Witkowski, Micron Stock Tanks as Sales Outlook Falls Well 
Short of Target, Production Growth Slashed, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www. 
marketwatch.com/story/micron-shares-drop-as-sales-outlook-falls-1-billion-short-of-wall-
street-target-2018-12-18. 
 130 See generally Shane Goodwin, The Long-Term Efficacy of Activist Directors, SSRN 
(Feb. 11, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2731369. Organic milk stands as one of the 
modern successes of market demand. See Catherine Green & William McBride, Consumer 
Demand for Organic Milk Continues to Expand – Can the U.S. Dairy Sector Catch Up?, 
CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2015 30(1), at 2-5. 
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are both innovating and paying a tax on capital, the fiscal bond moves from 
taxation as damages to taxation as investments in future capital regulation 
and administrative programs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the next century, global economic, environmental, and social 
conditions will require expensive private and public solutions. Accounting 
for the rise of automation, global warming, and underfunded social safety 
nets will cause an immense financial strain on national governments. So far, 
individual fiscal citizenship has failed in covering this funding gap. 
Consequently, the corporate actors responsible for the cause of these 
twenty-first century ailments need to step up, especially with a growing tax 
resistance among individuals in both the United States and abroad. To best 
capture the corporations’ proper obligation to the state, a mixture of the 
benefits theory and ability-to-pay principles must be used. Under the 
Gergen regime, capital taxation greatly affects both a corporation’s ability 
to amass revenue and operate in the global marketplace as well as the 
benefits it receives from having a government that creates stability for 
capital markets that allowed for the corporation’s growth. Without making 
corporations fulfill their true obligations to the state in compensation for 
their externalities, tax policy will favor the abuse of a corporation’s bad 
faith bargained-for rights. 
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